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greatly exceeded the amount of actuals, the transactions
have been held to be speculative in nature.41
Recently issued regulations
Final regulations were issued in late 1994 providing
guidance on reporting hedging and speculative transactions
involving futures.42 Taxpayers other than farmers and other
small businesses are required to take gains and losses from
hedges into account in the same period as the income,
deductions and gains or losses on the item hedged.43
However, for farm and small business taxpayers on the cash
method of accounting, the simpler methods used previously
and allowing the reporting of gains and losses on a cash
accounting basis can continue to govern the reporting of
hedge transactions if the taxpayer has no more than
$5,000,000 of gross receipts.44
Taxpayers are required to identify hedges when entered
into, along with the item or items hedged.45
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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
ANIMALS
CATTLE. The plaintiff was injured when the plaintiff’s
car struck a steer owned by the defendant on a public
highway. The steer had wandered 1400 feet to the highway
through an open gate. The defendant had testified that the
gate was closed when the defendant last used it the day
before the accident. The plaintiff provided no evidence of
any negligent act by the defendant which resulted in the gate
being left open. After noting that Fla. Stat. § 588.15
required a showing of intentional or negligent act by the
defendant before liability would attach for livestock running
at large on a public road, the trial court granted summary
judgment for the defendant. The plaintiff argued that the
statute, as interpreted by the trial court, placed too high a
burden on the plaintiff. The plaintiff also argued that the
“dog bite” statute subjected dog owners to a strict liability
standard; therefore, the plaintiff argued that Section 588.15,
as interpreted by the trial court, violated the plaintiff’s equal
80                                                                                                                                                                 Agricultural Law Digest
*Agricultural Law Manual (ALM). For information about ordering the Manual, see the last page of this issue.
protection rights. The court noted that a similar case was
decided in 1973 and that the legislature had not changed the
statute after that decision; therefore, the lack of legislative
action implied acceptance of the ruling. The court held that
absent some evidence of the defendant’s intentional or
negligent actions causing the gate to be open, the defendant
was not liable for the accident. Fisel v. Wynns, 667 So.2d
761 (Fla. 1996).
BANKRUPTCY
   FEDERAL TAXATION    -ALM § 13.03[7].*
COMPROMISE OFFERS. The debtors had made an
offer to compromise prior to assessment of back taxes and
the compromise was rejected by the IRS. After the
assessment, IRS alleged that the debtors had made an oral
second offer of compromise and the debtors’ attorney had
sent a letter appealing the rejection of the second offer. The
court held that the first offer did not extend the period for
making pre-petition assessments under Section
507(a)(7)(A)(ii) (now 507(a)(8)(A)(ii)) because it occurred
prior to the assessment, the oral second offer was not a valid
offer because it was not made on IRS forms, and the appeal
of the second rejection did not constitute an offer for
purposes of Section 507. In re Aberl, 78 F.3d 241 (6th Cir.
1996), aff’g, 175 B.R. 915 (N.D. Ohio 1994), aff'g, 159
B.R. 792 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1993).
DISCHARGE. The debtor was found to have concealed
assets from the IRS during tax years in which the debtor
failed to pay taxes and during which the IRS had
outstanding assessments against the debtor for previous
years. The debtor argued that concealment of assets was
insufficient to make the taxes for those years
nondischargeable under Section 523. The court held that
concealment of assets was sufficient evidence of an attempt
to evade taxes to make the taxes nondischargeable. Dalton
v. I.R.S., 77 F.3d 1297 (10th Cir. 1996).
REFUND. The debtor filed for Chapter 7 in February of
1995 and filed a 1994 joint return with the nondebtor spouse
in April 1995, claiming a refund. The tax return reflected
items of income and loss from the debtor’s law practice,
rental activity, farming activity and the nondebtor spouse’s
coffee shop business which had a significant loss for the
year. The debtor had paid $8,000 in estimated taxes but the
nondebtor spouse had not paid any estimated taxes. The
debtor argued that one-half of the refund was not estate
property and belonged to the spouse because the refund
resulted from the losses incurred by the spouse’s business.
The court held that the proration of a refund was to be
determined by comparing the income of each spouse to the
amount of estimated or withheld taxes paid by each.
Because the spouse did not make any tax payments, none of
the refund was allocated to the spouse, resulting in the total
refund being included in the bankruptcy estate. In re
Gleason, 193 B.R. 387 (Bankr. D. N.H. 1996).
TAX LIENS. The debtors were spouses married to two
brothers who had received farm property by inheritance.
The property became subject to a judgment lien after a
judgment was entered against two other brothers who also
inherited part of the property. The debtors sought protection
of their dower rights in the farm property as superior to the
judgment lien. The IRS filed tax liens against the property
for federal estate taxes due from the estates of the parents.
The debtors then filed for bankruptcy. The debtors prevailed
in the state court adjudication of the dower rights which
provided for compensation from the foreclosure sale to the
debtors’ dower rights. The IRS then filed a claim in the
bankruptcy case, asserting a security interest in the
compensation to be received for the dower rights. This
series of events produced a circular priority of security
interests with the judgment lien superior to the IRS lien, the
dower rights superior to the judgment lien and the tax lien
superior to the dower rights. The court held that the circuity
was resolved by first setting aside the judgment lien priority
amount, then allowing the IRS its priority in the remaining
amount, with the dower rights receiving a priority in the
remainder. If any funds remained, they belonged to the
judgment creditor. In re Stump, 193 B.R. 261 (Bankr.
N.D. Ohio 1995).
CONTRACTS
BREACH OF CONTRACT. The plaintiff contracted
with the defendant for the defendant to find a 10 year old
gelding trained as a hunter-jumper for about $10,000. The
defendant located a horse in another state which was
purported to be 11 years old. Both parties traveled to the
owner’s farm and viewed the horse. The plaintiff arranged
to have the owner’s “barn vet” examine the horse to
determine its age. The veterinarian stated that the horse was
11 years old and the plaintiff agreed to purchase the horse.
About one year later, the horse was re-examined and found
to be almost 20 years old and the plaintiff sued the
defendant for breach of contract, arguing that it was the
defendant’s responsibility to verify the horse’s age. The
court held that the Arkansas products liability statutes did
not apply because the defendant was not the seller of the
horse. The court also held that once the plaintiff arranged
for a veterinarian to determine the horse’s age, accepted that
determination and purchased the horse, the defendant’s
duties under the contract were fulfilled and the defendant
was not liable if the horse later turned out to be older.
Mason v. Jackson, 914 S.W.2d 728 (Ark. 1996).
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
EGGS. Puerto Rico promulgated a Market Regulation,
Number 3, section X(F) which required all eggs imported
from the continental United States to be labeled with the
two letter state postal abbreviation of its state of origin. The
plaintiff challenged the regulation as violating the Dormant
Commerce Clause because it imposed a substantial burden
on interstate commerce. The Puerto Rico Department of
Agriculture argued that the regulation was allowed by the
Egg Products Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. § 1052(b)(2) which
allowed noncontiguous states to require labeling showing
the state or area of production. The court noted that Section
1052(b)(2) was worded as an exemption from the labeling
restrictions of the Act and could not be read so as to exempt
noncontiguous states from the Dormant Commerce Clause
protections. Therefore, the court held that the regulation was
subject to the Dormant Commerce Clause. The court further
held that the regulation violated the Commerce Clause
because it placed a burden on commerce from other states
and the defendant failed to prove a legitimate local purpose.
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United Egg Producers v. Puerto Rico Department of
Agriculture, 77 F.3d 567 (1st Cir. 1996).
EXPORT OF CATTLE . The plaintiff was a
Zimbabwean cattle breeder who sought to purchase
breeding stock in the United States. The plaintiff chose three
heifers from one farm and contracted with a veterinarian to
test the animals for bovine leucosis because animals with or
exposed to animals with this diseased could not be imported
into Zimbabwe. The three heifers tested positive for the
disease and three other heifers were selected from the same
herd. These animals tested negative for the disease but the
veterinarian certified on the health certificate that the
animals did not come from a herd with a history of the
disease, even though three other animals had tested positive.
The USDA veterinarian issued export health certificates
based on the veterinarian’s report. The heifers were retested
in Zimbabwe after showing symptoms of the disease and
tested positive, requiring the slaughtering of the entire herd.
The plaintiff sued the examining veterinarian and the USDA
veterinarian. Since the Federal Tort Claims Act did not
waive governmental immunity for misrepresentation suits,
the plaintiff alleged that the USDA breached its duty under
the “good Samaritan” obligation which arose when the
USDA certified the cattle for export to Zimbabwe. The
court held that the plaintiff’s action was still barred as
basically one for misrepresentation but also held that even
under the “good Samaritan” rule, the USDA was not liable
because it did not undertake any examination of the cattle.
The court held that the only possible negligent party was the
examining veterinarian. The veterinarian argued that the
veterinarian owed no duty to the plaintiff because the
veterinarian was hired by the seller of the cattle. The court
held that the trial court’s summary judgment for the
defendant veterinarian was improper because the plaintiff
could provide evidence that the veterinarian was hired for
the purpose of fulfilling a part of the sales contract,
benefiting the plaintiff. Dorking Genetics v. U.S., 76 F.3d
1261 (2d Cir. 1996).
HERBICIDE. See Eide v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours
& Co., 542 N.W.2d 769 (S.D. 1996) summarized infra
under Products Liability.
FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAX
GENERATION SKIPPING TRANSFERS-ALM §
5.04[6].* The decedent’s estate included the decedent’s
interest in an inter vivos trust which became irrevocable
upon the decedent’s death. At the decedent’s death, the trust
was to be split into two trusts, one funded with a fraction of
the estate equal to the amount of the GSTT exemption
amount over the total trust value. The other trust was to
receive the remainder of the estate. The trustee funded the
trusts with non-prorata shares of the estate property but the
property chosen for each trust fairly represented the
appreciation or depreciation which had occurred since the
decedent’s death. The IRS ruled that the first trust was
eligible for the GSTT exemption and that the inclusion ratio
for that trust was zero. Ltr. Rul. 9617029, Jan. 26, 1996.
MARITAL DEDUCTION-ALM § 5.04[3].* The
decedent’s estate included an inter vivos trust which became
irrevocable upon the decedent’s death. Upon the decedent’s
death, the trust passed to the surviving spouse and was split
into two trusts, a marital GSTT exemption trust and a
marital share trust. The decedent’s will bequeathed an
amount of trust property equal to the GSTT exemption
amount to the GSTT trust. The remainder of the trust
property passed to the marital share trust. The decedent’s
will provided that estate, inheritance and other taxes, and all
debts, funeral expenses, last illness expenses and
administrative expenses were to be paid from trust principal
except to the extent the executor elects to pay such expenses
from trust income generated during the time between the
decedent’s death and the distribution to the two trusts but
only if such election did not diminish the marital deduction.
The IRS cited Estate of Street v. Comm’r, 974 F.2d 723 (6th
Cir. 1992) for the rule that all estate expenses are considered
to have accrued as of the decedent’s date of death; therefore,
such expenses diminish the estate before any bequests are
satisfied, regardless of whether the expenses are paid from
estate property or income from estate property. The IRS
ruled that the marital GSTT trust was not reduced by the
expenses because that trust was funded with a specific
bequest; however, because the marital trust received the
residue of the trust property, the expenses, whether paid
from principal or income, reduced the amount of the estate
passing to the surviving spouse and eligible for the marital
deduction. Ltr. Rul. 9617003, Jan. 3, 1996.
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari on April 29,
1996 for Est. of Hubert v. Comm’r, 63 F.3d 1083 (11th
Cir. 1995), aff’g, 101 T.C. 314 (1993) which conflicted
with Estate of Street, supra and Burke v. United States, 994
F.2d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1993), cert denied., 114 S. Ct. 546
(1993) on the issue involved in Ltr. Rul. 9617003, Jan. 3,
1996.
VALUATION. The taxpayer received several parcels of
land as gifts, with the donor retaining a life estate in each
parcel. The IRS used several sales of comparable nearby
land to determine the fair market value of the parcels. The
taxpayer’s appraiser claimed that no comparable sales were
available and used an income-producing approach to value
the parcels. However, both parties agreed that a comparable
sales approach would produce the most accurate valuation.
The court held that the IRS value was to be used to value the
gifts. In re Taylor, 96-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,229
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1996).
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
BAD DEBT-ALM § 4.03[7]. * The taxpayers obtained a
default judgment in 1991 against another person for general
and punitive damages; however, the taxpayers were unable
to collect on the judgment. The taxpayers claimed the
general and punitive damages as a nonbusiness bad debt on
their 1991 tax return. The taxpayers argued that the damage
awards became a debt which was not collectible. The court
held that because the taxpayers did not include the damage
awards in income, no deduction was allowed. The IRS also
claimed that the taxpayers failed to show any tax basis in the
debt or that the debt became worthless in 1991. Walter v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1996-200.
CAPITAL EXPENSES. The taxpayer was a
commercial airline. The taxpayer was required by the FAA
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to perform periodic full inspections of the aircraft engines,
which included repair or replacement of engine parts if
necessary. The IRS ruled that the cost of the inspections and
repairs were capital expenses because the life expectancy of
the engines and the value of the engines were significantly
enhanced by the inspections and repairs. Ltr. Rul. 9618004,
Jan. 23, 1996.
DEPRECIATION-ALM § 4.03[4].* The IRS has issued
procedures for obtaining automatic consent to change a
taxpayer’s method of accounting in order to claim allowable
depreciation or amortization where the taxpayer has claimed
less than the allowable depreciation or amortization. The
omitted depreciation or amortization is taken into account
through an I.R.C. § 481(a) adjustment. Taxpayers may also
elect to make the change through the procedures provided in
Rev. Proc. 92-20, 1992-1 C.B. 685. The procedure is
available for property (1) for which less than allowable
depreciation or amortization was claimed due to the
accounting method used by the taxpayer, (2) to which I.R.C.
§§ 167, 168, 197 or 168 (prior to amendment in 1986)
apply, and (3) which is held by the taxpayer at the beginning
of the year of the change in accounting method. The
procedure does not apply to (1) property subject to I.R.C. §
1016(a)(3); (2) intangible property subject to I.R.C. § 167
(except § 167(f)); (3) property for which the taxpayer is
seeking to revoke a timely election or to make a late election
under I.R.C. §§ 167, 168, former 168 or 197; (4) property
for which the taxpayer is seeking to change the estimated
life (except property subject to I.R.C. §167(f); (5) property
for which the use is changing; (6) changes in accounting
involving a change from deducting the cost or other basis of
any property as an expense to capitalizing and depreciating
the cost or other basis; (7) changes from a permissible
method to another permissible method; and (8) changes
affecting items other than depreciation. Rev. Proc. 96-31,
I.R.B. 1996-20.
INSTALLMENT REPORTING-ALM § 6.03[1].* The
taxpayer was an employee of a corporation and acquired
stock in the corporation which was subject to a repurchase
agreement if the taxpayer’s employment terminated. The
taxpayer division in the corporation was sold to another
company and the taxpayer entered into an agreement to
resell the stock to the corporation for cash and a promissory
note. The note provided for annual payments during the
following two years. The corporation had significant legal
problems in the year of the stock repurchase agreement and
filed for bankruptcy before paying anything on the
promissory notes. The taxpayer did obtain some recovery in
the bankruptcy case. The first issue was whether the stock
repurchase agreement was an installment contract. The
taxpayer argued that the agreement was not an installment
contract because the promissory note did not qualify as an
installment “payment.” The court held that, although a
promissory note itself would not qualify as an installment
payment, the payments on the note would; therefore, the
repurchase agreement was an installment contract. The
taxpayer claimed the note as a  bad debt deduction for the
year of the stock repurchase agreement, arguing that the
corporation’s legal troubles indicated that no payments
would be made on the note. The court held that the taxpayer
failed to prove that the note was worthless in the year
claimed since the corporation did continue in business for
two years before filing for bankruptcy. Barrett v. Comm’r,
T.C. Memo. 1996-199.
FARM EXPENSES. The taxpayers purchased a rural
residence on 113 acres. The taxpayer claimed that they
intended to start a farming operation on the land and
incurred equipment and maintenance expenses related to the
farm. The court found that the taxpayers failed to provide
any evidence to support their claimed expenses or that the
expenses were related to farming. Therefore, the deductions
for the expenses were denied. Mitchell v. Comm’r, T.C.
Memo. 1996-217.
LEGAL FEES. The taxpayer was a residuary legatee of
an estate. The estate included rental property which was
sold by the executors. The taxpayer filed a suit against the
executors for mismanagement of the estate, including the
loss of income from the rental property. The taxpayer won a
portion of the suit and claimed the legal fees and costs
incurred as a deduction. The taxpayer argued that because a
portion of the estate included business income property, the
legal fees were incurred for the protection of income. The
court held that the underlying cause of the action pursued by
the taxpayer was the mishandling of the estate by the
executors causing a reduction of the residuary estate passing
to the taxpayer; therefore, the legal fees were incurred
primarily to protect the taxpayer’s interests in the estate and
the legal fees were not deductible. Looby v. Comm’r, T.C.
Memo. 1996-207.
PARTNERSHIPS-ALM § 7.03.*
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES. A general
partnership converted to a limited liability company with all
assets and liabilities passing to the new organization. The
IRS ruled that no gain or loss would be recognized from the
conversion and the partners’ basis in the LLC would be the
same as in the partnership.  Ltr. Rul. 9618021, Feb. 2,
1996; Ltr. Rul. 9618022, Feb. 2, 1996; Ltr. Rul. 9618023,
Feb. 2, 1996.
S CORPORATIONS-ALM § 7.02[3][c].*
ELECTION. The taxpayers claimed to have timely
mailed a Form 2553 to the IRS but the IRS claimed to have
not received it. The court found that the taxpayers presented
credible evidence that the form was mailed but that the IRS
provide sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption of the
mailing. The court also held that I.R.C. § 7502(a) did not
apply because the taxpayers did not provide any evidence of
a postmark. The appellate decision is designated as not for
publication. Smith v. Comm’r, 96-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)
¶ 50,232 (9th Cir. 1996), aff’g, T.C. Memo. 1994-270.
SALE OF RESIDENCE. The taxpayer had purchased
rental real estate with the taxpayer's parents as tenants in
common. The purchase was made with a loan for which the
taxpayer was personally liable. The taxpayer then sold the
taxpayer's personal residence. The taxpayer gave the parents
the taxpayer's interest in the rental property but remained
liable on the debt. The taxpayer then repurchased the rental
property from the parents for use as the personal residence
and assumed the entire remaining balance of the loan. The
court held that taxpayer could not include the assumed debt
in calculating the tax gain or loss deferment on the sale and
repurchase of a personal residence because the assumed
debt was not incurred within two years of the sale and
repurchase, since the taxpayer became liable on the debt
many years before the sale of the personal residence.
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Dunnegan v. Comm'r, 96-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶
50,234 (3d Cir. 1996), aff’g, T.C. Memo. 1995-167.
SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS. In 1991, the
taxpayers received Social Security disability benefits but did
not include any of the benefits in gross income. The
taxpayers stated that they relied on a Form 886-A from an
audit of the taxpayers’ 1987 tax returns which stated that
Social Security disability payments were nontaxable. The
court held that one-half of the benefits were included in
gross income and upheld the IRS assessment of an
accuracy-related penalty under I.R.C. § 6662(a). Maki v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1996-209.
LANDLORD AND TENANT
LEASE. The plaintiff corporation was formed to operate
a hydroponics greenhouse on land owned by the defendants.
The defendants were also shareholders in the plaintiff
corporation and the parties entered into an “Incorporators’
Letter of Agreement” which provided for the construction of
the greenhouse and lease of the land and greenhouse to the
corporation. However, several aspects of the lease were not
spelled out in the Agreement  and the Agreement listed
several other issues which needed to be agreed to before the
lease could be executed. The court held that the Agreement
did not create a binding lease because the Agreement, the
actions of the parties (including the failure to charge any
rent), and the negotiations leading to the Agreement
indicated that the lease was yet to be negotiated. Therefore,
the defendants’ eviction of the plaintiff corporation was not
a breach of any lease. Waterfall Farm Systems, Inc. v.
Craig, 914 F. Supp. 1213 (D. Md. 1995).
NEGLIGENCE
ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE. The plaintiff’s son was
injured when the son trespassed on the defendant’s land,
climbed into the second story of a barn and fell through a
hole made when the son removed a floor board. The
plaintiff sued, arguing that the barn was an attractive
nuisance and that the defendant failed to exercise reasonable
care to eliminate the danger  or protect children who might
be attracted to the barn. The court held that the attractive
nuisance doctrine did not apply because the barn was not an
artificial condition on the land which was used as a farm. In
addition, the court held that the barn did not impose an
unreasonable risk for trespassing children because the
danger of falling through a hole in a floor after removing a
plank was an open and obvious danger to children. Cruce v.
Kennington, 467 S.E.2d 227 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996).
PATENTS
HYDROPONIC SYSTEM. The plaintiff corporation
had acquired the rights to develop and market a hydroponic
growing system which it had acquired from one of its
shareholders who held the original patent. The system was
constructed in a greenhouse on land owned by two other
shareholders. After a dispute among the shareholders
became unreconcilable, the land and greenhouse owners
evicted the plaintiff and continued the operation of the
greenhouse using the hydroponic system. The plaintiffs sued
for violation of the patent. The defendants argued that the
patent was invalid, under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), because the
inventor had sold a system more than one year before
applying for the patent. The court agreed that the testimony
of the inventor demonstrated that the patent was invalid
because a sale of the system was made more than one year
before the inventor applied for the patent.  Waterfall Farm
Systems, Inc. V. Craig, 914 F. Supp. 1213 (D. Md. 1995).
PRODUCTS LIABILITY
CULTIVATOR. The plaintiff was injured while
replacing a hydraulic cylinder on one wing of a cultivator
manufactured by the predecessor in interest to the
defendant. The plaintiff sued for negligence in failing to
provide a warning that the new cylinder had to be fully
charged before removing the pin which held the wing in an
upright position. The defendant was found to be 67 percent
at fault and the plaintiff was awarded actual and punitive
damages. The cultivator had been manufactured by a
company which was sold or consolidated with other
companies over several years, with the defendant being the
current owner of the rights to produce the cultivator used by
the plaintiff. Although only one similar accident occurred
during the life of the original manufacturer, by the time the
defendant acquired the manufacturing rights, several
accidents had occurred but the defendant had not made any
attempt to warn current cultivator owners about the dangers
of replacing hydraulic cylinders. The defendant argued that
it had no duty to warn in this case because it did not
manufacture the cultivator. The court held that because the
defendant had knowledge of the accidents and received a
current benefit from selling cultivators with the same name,
the defendant was liable for failing to warn current owners.
The court noted that the jury had allocated liability among
the various owners of the manufacturing company. The
court upheld the jury allocation of fault based on sufficient
evidence. The court upheld the jury award of punitive
damages because the evidence demonstrated wanton
conduct by the defendant in failing to warn cultivator
owners after the defendant had knowledge of several similar
accidents. Patton v. TIC United Corp., 77 F.3d 1235
(10th Cir. 1996).
HERBICIDE . The plaintiff purchased a herbicide
manufactured by one defendant and sold by the other
defendant. The plaintiff applied the herbicide to a corn crop
and claimed that the herbicide damaged the crop. The
plaintiff sued in negligence, products liability, and breach of
express and implied warranty. The actions were based on
claims that the defendants failed to warn about the damage
caused by the herbicide and that the herbicide was
defectively designed and manufactured. The defendants
argued that the actions were preempted by FIFRA. The
court held that the actions for failure to warn were
preempted by FIFRA but the actions for defective design
and manufacture were not preempted. Eide v. E.I. Du Pont
de Nemours & Co., 542 N.W.2d 769 (S.D. 1996).
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USUFRUCT (LIFE ESTATE). The plaintiff owned
naked title (vested remainder interest) in timberland in
which the defendant owned an usufruct (life estate). The
defendant had contracted for the clear cutting of 113 acres
of the land and the plaintiff objected to anything more than
selective cutting. The land was not actively managed as a
tree farm but was merely an old stand of trees which had
naturally grown on the property. The court held that
because the land was not managed as a tree farm with
periodic harvesting of the trees, the usufruct owner did not
have a right to harvest all of the trees but could harvest only
so much as a prudent administrator would harvest in order
to provide a regular income but also preserve the substance
of the property for the naked title owner. The court found
that a clear cut would impair the value of the property for
almost 40 years until another stand of marketable trees
would be produced. Thus, the court allowed the defendant
to selectively harvest the timber on the 113 acres such that
the stand would still produce such income when the land
passed to the naked title owner. Kennedy v. Kennedy, 668
So.2d 485 (La. Ct. App. 1996).
STATE TAXATION
SALES TAX. The Washington legislature has passed
an exemption from sales tax for labor and services for
constructing, repairing or improving new and existing
agricultural employee housing and for the sale of personal
property which becomes an ingredient or component of the
housing. Ch. 117, Laws 1996, eff. March 20, 1996.
CITATION UPDATES
Moretti v. Comm’r, 77 F.3d 637 (2d Cir. 1996) (net
operating losses) see p. 68 supra.
AGRICULTURAL LAW MANUAL
by Neil E. Harl
This comprehensive, annotated looseleaf manual is an
ideal deskbook for attorneys, tax consultants, lenders and
other professionals who advise agricultural clients. The
book contains over 900 pages and an index.
As a special offer to Digest subscribers, the Manual is
offered to new subscribers at $115, including at no extra
charge updates published within five months after
purchase. Updates are published every four months to keep
the Manual current with the latest developments. After the
first free update, additional updates will be billed at $100
per year or $35 each.
For your copy, send a check for $115 to Agricultural
Law Press, P.O. Box 50703, Eugene, OR 97405.
Satisfaction guaranteed. 30 day return privilege.
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